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ESSAY

The Emergence of the New Chinese Banking
System: Implications for Global Politics and
the Future of Financial Reform
SHRUTI RANA†

INTRODUCTION
As the current financial crisis unfolds around the world, China‘s
newfound financial and political power is dominating global legal,
financial, and political arenas. One recent incident illustrating
China‘s growing clout occurred in October 2011, when Western
media breathlessly reported that many ―European countries are
looking for a lifeline to extricate themselves from the continent‘s
severe sovereign debt crisis, which threatens to collapse the
continent‘s financial system.‖1 The ―lifeline‖ these countries and
banks were looking to was China.2
As examples of China‘s rapidly expanding financial and political
power emerge on a nearly daily basis, it is more critical than ever to
†

Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
These remarks were inspired by my participation in the University of Maryland 2011
International Law Symposium, China, Taiwan, and International Law: A Symposium in
Honor of Professor Hungdah Chiu, October 5–6, 2011. I would like to thank the other
symposium participants for their thoughtful contributions, especially Daniel C.K. Chow and
Andy Y. Sun, my co-panelists on the Contemporary Perspectives on International Private
Law Panel. In addition, I would like to thank Professors Carl Minzner, David Super, and
David Gamage for their insightful feedback on these remarks, and the editors of the
Maryland Journal of International Law, Jennifer Thompson, Emanwel Turnbull, and
Catherine Gonzalez for their excellent research assistance. Also, I would like to thank the
participants in the New Perspectives on Comparative Law Conference at The George
Washington University Law School, on April 20, 2012, who provided invaluable feedback.
1. Barry Hatton, China Charms Europe, but Beijing Has Own Agenda, GUARDIAN,
Sept. 18, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9852405. See also Aaron Back
& Esther Fung, China’s Wen Vague on Help for Europe, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2011, at A13
(noting that the European debt crisis has put new focus on a potential role for China and
other developing economies to come to the aid of Western economies in trouble, but has also
underlined the limits to any such scenario, and quoting Premier Wen as stating that ―China
remains willing to expand its investment in the EU‖).
2. See supra note 1.
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understand the depth and breadth of the current financial and political
transformations occurring in China, and in particular the rapid
reforms occurring in the Chinese banking system as the country seeks
to assume the mantle of the world‘s new banker. Indeed, as one
commentator has recently suggested, perhaps the
most salient feature of the twentieth century so far has been
China‘s emergence as a global force . . . . The world is
going through a period of major development, reform and
adjustment. With the growth of multi-polarization, and
economic globalization, China and other emerging
countries are clearly set to play much more important roles
in the second decade of the 21st century. And there have
been many predictions as to what this future world will
look like.3
These remarks, as set forth below, seek to begin a dialogue into
what this new world may look like as global markets rapidly rise, fall,
and transform, focusing on the rise of China in particular and the
political and financial consequences of its recent and unprecedented
path to power. First, these remarks discuss the massive changes that
have transformed the Chinese banking system over the last two
decades from a largely insular, state-run system to one that is moving
to a more market-based economy.4 These remarks then proceed to
elaborate how these changes have accelerated over the last decade,
particularly in the wake of the global financial crisis.5 In analyzing
the history of the Chinese banking transformation, these remarks
discuss how and why China is moving in a direction contrary to that
of most western regimes, as it moves from a more public banking
system to a more privatized one.
Ultimately, these remarks seek to further the global debate over
the lessons that can be learned from the Chinese experience as China
navigates the public/private divide in unique and distinctive ways.
China‘s banking system has come to straddle the public/private
3. Zhaoxing Li, Setting the Record Straight on China’s Global Ambitions, EUROPE‘S
WORLD, Autumn 2011, http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Homeold/Article/tabid
/191/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/21907/language/en-US/Settingtherecordstraighton
Chinasglobalambitions.aspx.
4. See Keith Bradsher, Vows of Support, and Persistent Anxiety: China Links
Investment in Europe with Its Own Agenda for Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, at B1.
5. See David Barboza, China’s Treasury Holdings Make U.S. Woes Its Own, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2011, at B1 (describing the measures the Chinese government is taking to
ease structural imbalances in light of the global financial crisis, and in reaction to U.S.
financial problems in particular).
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divide in remarkably different ways than the American, European,
and other market-based banking regimes it is competing with. In
essence, China is charting its own path as it creates a new banking
model—that is, developing a new banking model with ―Chinese
characteristics.‖6
As part of this examination, these remarks also briefly consider
whether China is at the forefront of a new geopolitical
development—a development that has been called the rise of new
state capitalism. More specifically, one of the key questions facing
the geo-political arena is whether a new form of market capitalism is
emerging that explicitly embraces a strong state role, with China
leading the way in this movement.7 One author has described this
transition, and China‘s leading role in this transformation, as follows:
[t]wenty years ago state firms were nothing more than parts
of the government machine. Ten years ago, there was
widespread doubt about whether they could succeed. Today
they include some of the world‘s biggest companies,
sucking up profits at home and taking on the world market
with a will. Between 2005 and 2011, four of the world‘s top
ten stockmarket flotations involved Chinese state
companies (and collectively raised $64.5 billion).8
These developments underscore the speed, breadth, and significance
of China‘s banking reforms for the future of global market
capitalism, and the necessity of studying these reforms in depth.
Yet another interesting angle of China‘s global impact lies in
understanding how China‘s banking reforms have shored up its
financial and political power, sometimes subtly and sometimes
explicitly, at the expense of the United States, Europe, and Japan. Not
surprisingly, as China has become the world‘s largest export
economy, and U.S. dependence on Chinese exports and debt buying
has increased dramatically,9 China‘s national pride has surged. This
6. Richard N. Cooper, Recent Books on International Relations, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan./Feb. 2003, at 159, 161 (reviewing GREGORY C. CHOW, CHINA‘S ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION (2002)).
7. See New Masters of the Universe, How State Enterprise Is Spreading, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 21, 2012, at 6, 6–8 (noting that varieties of state capitalism all have something in
common: politicians have far more power than they do under liberal capitalism; for example,
in authoritarian regimes, politicians can restructure entire industries at the stroke of a pen,
although there are nevertheless limits even under these systems to the ―Leviathan‘s‖ power).
8. And the Winner Is. . ., ECONOMIST, Jan. 21, 2012, at 17–18.
9. See Barboza, supra note 5.
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interesting, yet largely overlooked, strand of China‘s rise to greater
financial power includes a greater willingness to critique the United
States and contrast China‘s successes with perceived American
weaknesses, as well as compare China‘s brand of market capitalism
with that of the United States.10 These remarks therefore analyze
several recent examples of how China has been able to use banking
reforms to not only achieve greater financial and political power, but
also to create a more prominent and confident global voice. Finally,
these remarks conclude with a discussion of some of the lessons for
the future that can be drawn from China‘s recent experiences, both
for the current global financial crisis and for how such crises may be
moderated in the future.
I.

THE FOUNDING OF A BANKING SYSTEM UNDER STRICT
CENTRALIZED CONTROL

China‘s moves towards market capitalism are relatively recent
and remain controversial.11 These remarks thus begin by examining
China‘s recent banking reforms with reference to its historical and
cultural past, explaining how China developed a uniquely public and
private banking system which has in part led China‘s fortunes to
diverge from those of other major banking regimes during this time
of financial crisis.
China‘s modern banking system, as with much of its economy
after the ascension of the Communist Party, was initially marked by
state ownership and central planning.12 During the first decade of
Communist rule, the government gave all control of banking and
monetary policy to the People‘s Bank of China (PBOC), founded in
1948.13 Over the next few decades, the Chinese government created
three other state-owned commercial banks, the China Construction
Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Industrial and
10. See Bob Davis & Aaron Back, China Slams U.S over Debt, WALL ST. J., July 29,
2011, at C3 (discussing a ―sharply-worded commentary from China‘s state news agency‖
regarding a possible downgrade of U.S. debt, and noting that in ―some of the strongest
language from China‘s government on the issue so far, one Xinhua article castigated U.S.
leaders for putting the world economy in jeopardy and called on [U.S. leaders] to ‗show
some sense of global responsibility‘‖).
11. See Bradsher, supra note 4 (noting that the European Union feels that China has yet
to meet the WTO‘s criteria for a market economy and the pace of China‘s transition to a
more market-oriented one is up to China, and therefore unpredictable).
12. Christopher D. Luehr, Red Banking: Chinese State-Owned Commercial Bank Reform
and the Basel II Accord, 20 MINN. J. INT‘L L. 171, 174 (2011).
13. Duncan Alford, The Influence of Hong Kong Banking Law on Banking Reform in the
PRC, 3 E. ASIA L. REV. 35, 38 (2008); Luehr, supra note 12, at 174.
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Commercial Banks of China (these three banks, along with the
PBOC, are also known as ―The Big Four‖).14
Unlike banking systems in the United States and Europe, during
this time China‘s banks did not actually pool savings or act as risk
managers.15 Instead, the banks primarily functioned as state creditgranting agencies, and their principal purpose was to fund the Central
Planning Committee‘s programs.16 During this period, the central
government controlled the corporate governance of the banks (much
as it dominated the corporate governance of all domestic companies
at this time).17
While this consolidation of power allowed the Central Planning
Committee to act quickly and decisively with respect to banking and
monetary policies and programs, it also created significant problems
that impeded bank efficiency and growth, echoing the experiences of
other centrally planned economies during that historical period.18
Such problems included a lack of discipline with respect to banking
policies as well as reduced incentives to maximize economic
efficiency.19
More specific problems included political pressure on banks,
which resulted in bank managers approving highly risky loans in
exchange for political favors.20 Bank managers believed that the
government would issue more loans or otherwise bail out the banks if
14. Luehr, supra note 12, at 174.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Peter Ferdinand, Russian and Soviet Shadows over China’s Future?, 68
INT‘L AFF. 279, 280 (1992) (noting that when China implemented its first five-year plan
between 1953 and 1957 it was consciously following the Soviet model of development and
its establishment of a centrally planned economy); Brian Sawers, Reevaluating the Evidence
for Anticommons in Transition Russia, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 233, 251 (2010) (recognizing
that corruption often arises as a response to the inefficiencies within centrally planned
economies); K. Matthew Wong, Securities Regulations in China and their Corporate
Finance Implications on State Enterprise Reform, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1221, 1224 (1996).
Wong notes that:
Viewed broadly, China‘s [current] reform movement is a direct response to the
gross inefficiency that prevailed within the planned economy. In many ways,
China‘s current problems with its state sector are similar to those encountered
in Russia and Eastern Europe. Years of directives from static state planning and
a complete lack of competition have led to bloated bureaucratic management
structures and obsolete manufacturing facilities.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
19. See Luehr, supra note 12, at 175.
20. Id.
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they ran into any significant economic trouble, creating a structural
disincentive for bank employees to maximize economic efficiency,
innovation, or profits.21 Moreover, at the time, corporate management
in China was not subject to western-style fiduciary duty rules22 which
impeded efforts against corruption and self-dealing.23
As these problems grew, the Chinese government began to
rethink its policies, and decided to begin liberalizing its banking
system. As a result, in the late 1970s, the Chinese government
embarked on a far-reaching set of reforms aimed at moving away
from a centrally planned system to one that began to embrace free
trade and liberal economic principles.24 Significantly, China‘s
reforms were motivated both by a desire to open up its markets as
well as an explicit desire to ―build a stronger nation.‖25
II. A SHIFT TOWARD OPENNESS IN THE CHINESE BANKING SYSTEM
China began to change its banking and economic systems in
1978 during the ―Opening Up‖ period under Deng Xiaopeng.26
During this time, China began to gingerly privatize its banking
system, allowing banks greater authority to manage their businesses
and lending.27 Between 1978 and 1986, China‘s reforms slowly
carved out a more limited role for the PBOC, created three additional
state banks,28 and allowed banks more autonomy over their business
dealings, enabling them to expand and set up local branches
throughout the country. These ―incremental reform[s] ushered in the
first wave of Chinese economic growth, during which industries and
banks flung off the shackles of government control,‖ at least
21. Id.
22. Chinese law did not impose Western-style fiduciary duties upon corporate
management until 2006, when China‘s PRC Company Law went into effect. The Company
Law of 2006 fundamentally revised the country‘s corporate law, with the aim of improving
―the operational efficiency of Chinese companies and serve the development of Chinese
capital markets.‖ Craig Anderson & Bingna Guo, Corporate Governance Under the New
Company Law (Part 1): Fiduciary Duties and Minority Shareholder Protection, CHINA L. &
PRAC., Apr. 2006, http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/1692150/Channel/9949/
Corporate-Governance-under-the-New-Company-Law-Part-1-Fiduciary-Duties-andMinority-Shareholder.html.
23. Luehr, supra note 12, at 175.
24. Id. at 175–76.
25. Id. at 175 (citing NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, CHINA WAKES: THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RISING POWER (1994)).
26. Luehr, supra note 12, at 175.
27. Id. at 176.
28. See supra Part I (discussing the formation of the ―Big Four‖ banks).
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tentatively.29 The Chinese government soon realized, however, that it
could not truly move further towards a free (or ―free-er‖) enterprise
system by only tinkering with the existing state-run banking system.
Rather, a new banking framework was required.30
Consequently, in 1986, the Chinese government took its first
steps towards creating a new legal framework for its banking system,
issuing ―Provisional Regulations on the Control of Banks,‖ the first
comprehensive regulation aimed at the Chinese banking industry.31
The government intended to develop a framework that would serve to
allow the country to move towards a more market-based system
which would give businesses more freedom, yet still allow the
government to maintain strong control.32
During the remainder of the decade and into the 1990s, China
grew economically and expanded its political influence. As China
began liberalizing and privatizing more rapidly, and China‘s banks
gained more freedom to lend in furtherance of economic efficiency
and productivity (as opposed to serving other political ends), the ―Big
Four‖ banks quickly realized that they needed to reform and further
modernize their internal banking structures and practices.33
Reinforcing this push for reform was China‘s stated goal of accession
to the World Trade Organization (WTO).34 To aid these goals and
reduce the number of nonperforming loans at local branches
(primarily due to policy-based lending practices), the government
passed another set of banking reforms in the mid-1990s: The Law of
the People‘s Republic of China on the People‘s Bank of China and
the Law of the People‘s Republic of China on Commercial
Banking.35 These laws successfully addressed agency problems at the
local branches, but were otherwise broadly and vaguely drafted and
failed to adequately address corporate governance issues at the
national banks.36
When the Asian Financial Crisis hit in 1997, however, China
took heed of the problems its neighbors were facing and decided that
it needed to further reform its banking system in order to avoid
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Luehr, supra note 12, at 176.
Id.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id. at 176–77.
Id. at 177.
Id.
Id.
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similarly debilitating crises.37 In 1998, China recapitalized the Big
Four banks, primarily due to the large amount of nonperforming
loans they held.38 China created an asset management company for
each of the Big Four, which took over the approximately $170 billion
in nonperforming loans.39 Also in 1998, the government separated the
securities, insurance, and banking supervisory structures in the
PBOC.40 During this period, China‘s most successful reform was
replacing its old credit-planning system with the asset liability
management system as broadly described above.41 China also
improved its banks‘ capital adequacy by complying with the Basel
Committee‘s International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards (Basel II).42 In doing so, China was also able to
increase its credibility with WTO members, a critical step towards its
entry into the WTO.43
III. CHINA LEAPS FORWARD BY ACCEDING TO THE WTO
Although China had first begun to open its banking system to
foreign banks in a limited manner in 1991, WTO accession
compelled China to further liberalize its banking system.44
Essentially, as part of the accession process, China was required to
make a broad range of concessions to the other members of the WTO
who wanted greater access to the Chinese banking industry,
especially the United States, the European Community, Japan,
Australia, and Canada.45 These reforms are also notable because they
were externally, rather than internally driven—during this period,
China was essentially forced to enact liberalizing reforms in order to
comply with its international obligations.46
When China acceded to the WTO in December 2001, it pledged
to fully liberalize foreign access to its domestic banking services

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 177–78; Alford, supra note 13, at 39.
Alford, supra note 13, at 39.
Id.
Id.
Luehr, supra note 12, at 178.
Id.
Id.
Ge Jianguo, WTO and Revision of China’s Foreign Banking Regulations, 124
BANKING L.J. 536, 536–37 (2007).
45. Id.
46. See generally Icksoo Kim, Accession into the WTO: External Pressure for Internal
Reforms in China, 11 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 433 (2002).
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market over a five-year period.47 Under the WTO requirements,
China was required to allow foreign financial services institutions to
supply banking services in accordance with the terms set out in its
General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS)48 schedule.49
China‘s GATS schedule stated that with respect to sectors
covered by banking commitments, ―[w]ithin five years after
accession foreign financial institutions will be permitted to provide
services to all Chinese clients,‖ as well as foreign clients, through a
―commercial presence‖ in China.50 These foreign financial
institutions were supposed to be permitted to provide services in the
form of, inter alia, bank deposits, various types of lending, and
payment and money transmissions.51 China‘s commitment to allow
foreign banks to enter the Chinese banking services market through a
―commercial presence‖ included allowing foreign entities to
constitute new banks, acquire existing banking institutions, and,
importantly, gave foreign entities the ability to maintain
establishments in China without limitations on corporate form or
foreign capital participation.52 China was also required to eliminate
any ―non-prudential measures restricting ownership, operation, and
juridical form of foreign financial institutions, including on internal
branching and licenses‖ as well as any remaining geographic
restrictions on banking services.53
While some of these goals have been met or are in the process of
implementation, others remain to be fulfilled despite the completion
of China‘s five-year transition period.54 During the transition period,
however, the push to comply with the commitments it made to secure
WTO accession led China to rapidly accelerate its reforms aimed at
liberalization and modernization of the banking system. For example,
in 2003, China created the China Banking Regulatory Commission
(CBRC), which assumed critical PBOC regulatory functions,
47. Daniel C. Crosby, Banking on China’s WTO Commitments: ‘Same Bed, Different
Dreams’ in China’s Financial Services Sector, 11 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 75, 81 (2008).
48. Id.
49. See Ministerial Conference Report, Report on the Working Party on the Accession of
China, WT/MIN(01)/3/Add.2, at 30, 35–36 (2001) [hereinafter GATS Schedule]; World
Trade Org., Protocol on the Accession of the People‘s Republic of China, Pt. II, 103
WT/L/432 (2001) (incorporating China‘s GATS schedule).
50. Crosby, supra note 47, at 83–84 (quoting GATS Schedule, supra note 49, at 34–35).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 84.
53. GATS Schedule, supra note 49, at 34–35.
54. Crosby, supra note 47, at 104.
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including regulating banks, Asset Management Companies (AMCs),
and trust and investment companies, and generally helped maintain a
stable financial system. Also in 2003, the Chinese government
recapitalized the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank in
preparation for listing the banks on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
(the listings were ultimately completed in 2005).55 In addition, in
2004, China amended its commercial banking laws and allowed
London bank HSBC to invest in the Bank of Communications—the
―largest equity investment in a Chinese bank since 1949.‖56
The Bank of China conducted its initial public offering (IPO) on
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in mid-2006. In October of that year
(after the government recapitalized it with $50 billion), the Industrial
and Commercial Bank of China conducted its IPO on the Hong Kong
and Shanghai stock exchanges; at the time, this offering constituted
the world‘s largest IPO.57
On the same day that China‘s five-year transitional period ended,
China also implemented the Regulations of the People‘s Republic of
China for the Administration of Foreign Investment Banks (New
Regulations) and their implementing rules (New Rules).58 These rules
were aimed at allowing foreign countries or banking entities to enter
the Chinese market, though in a highly constrained manner.59 The

55. Alford, supra note 13, at 40.
56. Id. Notably, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China‘s IPO no longer holds the
world record for the largest single stock offering—that record was surpassed in 2010,
interestingly, by the Agricultural Bank of China, which conducted the world‘s largest firsttime share sale in 2010 with an initial public offering of $22.1 billion. See Jamil Anderlini,
State Share Prop-up Makes AgBank Largest Listing, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2010, at 9.
57. Alford, supra note 13, at 41 (citing Keri Greiger, ICBC Makes Strong Debut in Hong
Kong, Shanghai, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2006, at B5).
58. Ge Jianguo, supra note 44, at 536.
59. A World Bank working paper gives an apt summary of the scope and impact of these
changes:
Under the 1994 commitments, foreign banks could only operate in specified
regions, accept deposits only from non-residents, and only in foreign currencies
(with some exceptions), and make no loans to Chinese citizens. On accession,
geographic and client limitations will be eliminated for foreign currency
businesses. Even though the schedule states that on accession, local currency
businesses will be allowed in four cities, (Shanghai, Shenzen, Tianjin, and
Dailian) there seems to be a binding restriction on clients which will only be
relaxed in two years. The entire banking sector [was to have been] fully
liberalized by 2006. As in the case of insurance, licenses are to be awarded
solely on the basis of prudential criteria with no quantitative limitations or
economic needs tests applied.
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New Regulations restrict the scope of activities that can be conducted
by foreign banks seeking to operate in China through branches
instead of through subsidiaries.60 In particular, foreign bank branches
can only take domestic currency deposits of one million renminbi or
more from Chinese individuals and cannot make local currency loans
to Chinese individuals.61 Moreover, foreign bank branches cannot
issue domestic currency credit cards to Chinese enterprises or
Chinese individuals.62 These restrictions have generated a great deal
of concern from other members of the WTO, including the United
States, who feel that China has not fulfilled its WTO commitments (a
view that continues to this day).63
Another significant development occurred in 2007, when the
CBRC issued The Guidelines on the Implementation of the New
Basel Accord by China‘s Banking Sector (Basel II Guidelines).64 The
Basel II Guidelines require full implementation of the entire Basel II
Aaditya Mattoo, China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: The Services
Dimension 9 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2932, 2002), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636294.
60. Article 8 imposes overall and branch level minimum capital requirements.
Regulations of the People‘s Republic of China on the Administration of Foreign-invested
Banks, art. 8 (promulgated by the State Council of the People‘s Republic of China, Nov. 8.
2006, effective Dec. 11, 2006), http://sg2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/chinalaw/investment
/200801/20080105317514.html [hereinafter New Regulations]. Banks must have maintained
a representative office in the PRC for at least two years in order to open a branch. Id. art. 12.
New businesses must go through a two-stage application process. Id. arts. 15, 18. Some of
the restrictions are set out in China Eases Restrictions on Foreign Retail Banks, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/16/business/worldbusiness/16ihtrules.3561
880.html.
61. See New Regulations, supra note 60, art. 31 (listing the activities that banks may carry
out). See also China Opens RMB Retail Business to Foreign Banks from 11 December 2006,
KING & WOOD MALLESONS (Nov. 22, 2006), http://www.mallesons.com/publications/
marketAlerts/2006/Documents/8696677w.htm.
62. These restrictions appear to be loosening, as recently China has indicated that it may
open its markets to credit cards. See Jennifer F. Friedman, China Nod for Citibank Credit
Cards May Show Market Opening, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Feb. 6, 2012,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-06/nod-for-citibank-s-credit-cards-may-signalchinese-banking-market-opening.html. See also Mark Drajem & Peter Eichenbaum, U.S.
Goes After China at WTO as Pressure Mounts from Congress, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 16,
2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-15/u-s-set-to-file-wto-complaints-againstchina-as-pressure-grows-over-trade.html.
63. See Friedman, supra note 62 (―The U.S. says the rules contravene a pledge the
world‘s most populous nation made when it joined the . . . WTO in 2001 to open its debitand credit-card markets to foreign processors . . . .‖). See also Drajem & Eichenbaum, supra
note 62 (reporting on the two WTO complaints filed by the United States against China
regarding payment-processing and steel duties).
64. The Guidelines on the Implementation of the New Basel Accord by China‘s Banking
Sector (promulgated by China Banking Regulation Comm‘n, Nov. 14, 2007),
http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/e/2007-11-14/10319.shtml.

Rana new macro

226

5/22/2012 10:15 AM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 27:215

framework by all large banks with operational entities in other
countries or regions, or with a large proportion of international
business. The Basel II Guidelines warn that State-Owned
Commercial Banks (SOCBs) should refrain from ―irrationally
rushing into the [sic] implementation‖65 of Basel II and that
―implementation of Basel II . . . should be [conducted] gradually.‖66
Instead of translating the provisions into separate regulations, the
Basel II Guidelines encourage SOCBs to implement Basel II as a
whole.67
The Basel II Guidelines essentially provided large-scale banks
with operational entities in other countries or regions, or with a large
proportion of international business, until 2013 to implement Basel
II.68 However, China exceeded the expectations of its own guidelines
when it announced that Chinese banks were likely to carry out its
Basel II obligations by the end of 2010;69 this announcement may be
an indication of the strength of China‘s economic growth, or simply
reflect its ambitions.70
Indeed, the question of why China accelerated implementation of
these requirements, particularly during the midst of a global financial
crisis, is an interesting one, and it is worth watching how China
proceeds in this respect in both the long and short-term.
Around this time the Chinese government also recognized the
emergence of a global economic power vacuum, which it sought to
fill in order to achieve greater global prominence.71 On a more
instrumental level, China was also trying to learn the lessons of the
past and create an economic system that could combine the best of
both market-based and central control.72 Each of these issues is
discussed below.

65. Id. pt. II.ii.
66. Id.
67. Id. pt. III.i.
68. Id. pt. V.iii.
69. Luehr, supra note 12, at 193. At the present time, it is unclear whether China has
succeeded in fulfilling its Basel II obligations.
70. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text.
71. See supra Part II.
72. See supra Part II.
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PRIVATIZED BANKING

As country after country felled by the current financial crisis
turns towards greater public control over its banking system,73 China
seems to be almost unique in moving in the opposite direction.
Indeed, China seems to be speeding up the privatization of its
banking system in the wake of the global financial crisis.74
As China moves closer to a privatized banking model, its
successes and failures are well worth further analysis. First, the speed
of China‘s recent reforms should not be underestimated. I was able to
witness the breathtaking pace of change in China firsthand. In 2010
and 2011, I traveled to China as part of a research team and
conducted interviews with banking officials, analyzed data on
structural and practical reforms in the banking sector, and observed
how China was attempting to transform its banking system from one
that suffered from unevenness in practice, liquidity, and loan
performance into one that was beginning to implement strong
corporate governance principles that echoed, and often matched,
those in the United States and Europe.75 For example, in just one year
between 2010 and 2011, Chinese banks began to form trade
associations and identify best practices, often based on international
models, and rapidly changed from a system tentatively moving
towards reform to one that appeared to enthusiastically embrace
Western-style management and prudential practices.76

73. Hatton, supra note 1 (mentioning austerity measures and public calls for
improvements). See generally Horst Loechel & Helena Xiang Li, China’s Changing Model
of Banking (EU-China Bus. Mgmt. Training Project, Working Paper No. 010, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1718166 (saying that belief
in the Western model of banking has been shaken).
74. See Barboza, supra note 5 (describing the measures the Chinese government is
taking to ease structural imbalances in light of the global financial crisis and U.S. financial
problems).
75. See International Clinic Advances Justice Around the World, UNIV. OF MD. FRANCIS
KING
CAREY
SCH.
OF
LAW,
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/about/features
/intlclinic.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2012); Zdenek Kudrna, Banking Reform in China
Driven by International Standards and Chinese Specifics 15 (TIGER Working Paper No.
109, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1026854
(describing governance reforms); Garcia-Herrero et al., China’s Banking Reform: An
Assessment of Its Evolution and Possible Impact, 52 CESIFO ECON. STUD. 304, 312 (2005)
(discussing weak corporate governance and improvements made thereto). Cf. Kwan Chi
Hung, Reform of China’s State-owned Banks a Success, NOMURA J. CAP. MARKETS, Winter
2009, at 1, 1–2 (stating that corporate governance has improved).
76. See, e.g., Introduction of CAM, CHINA ASS‘N OF MICROFINANCE,
http://en.chinamfi.net/pub/LIT_6.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2012) (describing the experiences
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Another key aspect of China‘s recent transformations is that
many of China‘s recent banking and financial reforms have a Chinese
twist—for example, China has imposed higher and more stringent
deposit requirements than the United States.77 In addition, as of
January 2011, while China had still not formally implemented a
deposit insurance system, it did acknowledge the importance of
quickly implementing one, and claims it is ―on track‖ to do so.78 In
lieu of a formal deposit insurance system, ―the government acts as a
de facto insurer for deposits in China‘s domestic banks.‖79 China‘s
moves towards implementation of a formal deposit insurance system
are also significant because deposit insurance is often implemented in
response to economic crises or to prepare for or avoid an economic
crisis or depression.80 In this light, it will be important to closely
observe how China‘s reforms in this area unfold.
Notably, China‘s economic reforms have also corresponded with
a significant rise in its global power and a resurgence of national
pride. China‘s growing financial and political might has led global
leaders and commentators to ask whether China is on the verge of
becoming a global financial leader, and perhaps even the world‘s
global financial leader.81 Or is it, like many other countries, in danger
of a spectacular economic collapse? Accurately assessing China‘s
immediate economic future is difficult, not least because China is
known for its lack of transparency and operation by government
fiat.82 Nonetheless, many analysts laud China‘s gains and predict its
impending world dominance. For example, from an outside
perspective, China appears to be following an age-old path from
financial dominance to political dominance.83 China is also poised to
of the China Microcredit Foundation (CAM), which grew exponentially during the years
2005 to 2010, and by 2010 began to emulate and implement Western-style banking
structures).
77. Daniel L. McCullough, Feeling the Stones: Measuring the Potential of Deposit
Insurance in China, 11 N.C. BANKING INST. 421, 445 (2007). See also China Widens Reserve
Ratio to Limit Inflation, Analysts Say, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 28, 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-28/china-may-limit-inflation-with-reserve-ratiomove-locking-up-140-billion.html (discussing the extension of the reserve requirements).
78. Wiang Xiotlan, Deposit Insurance System to Be Introduced, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 8,
2011), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/201101/08/content_11812713.htm.
79. Id. See also McCullough, supra note 77, at 424.
80. McCullough, supra note 77, at 430.
81. See Peirs Brendon, For China, Will Money Bring Power?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2010, at WK9.
82. Id.
83. See Zhiyong Lan et al., The Growing China and Its Prospective Role in World
Affairs, 6 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 43, 43–44 (1999) (discussing various responses to China‘s
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surpass Japan as the world‘s second largest economy, representing a
significant shift in the balance of global economic and political
power.84 Indeed, some have argued that this shift shows that ―China‘s
ascendance is for real, and that the rest of the world will have to
reckon with a new economic superpower‖—one that is second only
to the United States.85
However, China‘s financial picture is not entirely golden. As
noted above, China still lacks a secure deposit system—which was a
key factor in smoothing some of the wobbles of European and
American banking systems.86 Furthermore, a number of analysts have
noted that China‘s economic growth is slowing (from 10% in 2010 to
9% in 2012).87 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently
concluded a review of the Chinese banking system and reported that
Chinese banks were vulnerable to heavy losses due to a rise in offbalance-sheet liabilities and a housing boom.88 The IMF also pointed
out that the Chinese system was becoming more complex,
intertwined with other markets, and that informal credit markets and
off-balance-sheet activities are on the rise.89 Moreover, some analysts
feel that despite their recent gains and successes, China‘s banks are
insufficiently capitalized to be able to ―move from where they are
now to something else.‖90
At the same time, while these issues pose concerns for China‘s
growth and power, most analysts believe that China has heeded the
lessons of the countries whose housing markets have recently
collapsed and has begun acting proactively to address the risk of
economic bubbles, raising rates and increasing the cost of
rapid growth, including speculations that China may be pursuing an imperialistic agenda,
and contending that China‘s modernization in combination with the size of its economy
could have profound historical and global ramifications).
84. Lindsay Whipp & Jamil Anderlini, Chinese Economy Eclipses Japan’s, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 16, 2010, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/935zc446-a8d7-22df-86ee-00144eabdc0.htn
#axzz1dQPY9mF8.
85. David Barboza, China Overtakes Japan to Become No. 2 Global Economic Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at B1.
86. McCullough, supra note 77, at 422. See also Xiotlan, supra note 78.
87. Kenneth Rapoza, China’s Housing Bubble Past, and Its Future, FORBES, Nov. 8,
2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/11/08/chinas-housing-bubble-past-andits-future/.
88. Alan Hawkes, IMF Sounds Warning for Chinese Banking System, GUARDIAN, Nov.
15, 2011, http:///www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/nov/15/imf-warning-chinese-bakingsystem.
89. Id.
90. Nathan Vardi, Red Banks Rising: Will China Become the World’s Banker?, FORBES,
May 7, 2012, at 124, 126.
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borrowing—the very opposite of what the United States did at the
beginning of the recent housing crisis.91 In other words, thus far
China‘s credit-tightening efforts may allow it to avoid a hard landing
from its housing bubble and other potential economic problems, and
thereby prevent China‘s economic fortunes from sinking too far.92
Nonetheless, there are a number of political and financial
concerns which may slow China‘s rise. As noted above, the Chinese
system suffers from a lack of transparency, making it difficult to
gather and analyze hard data.93 The Chinese judiciary also lacks
complete independence, and no express legal or constitutional
provisions authorize citizen suits again government entities.94 It is
important to note, however, that China does appear to recognize and
is attempting to address some of these issues.95
Despite these concerns, overall China still appears to be heading
toward global financial and economic leadership, as discussed below.
V. GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA‘S BANKING TRANSFORMATION
Joseph Schumpeter once stated that ―[t]he monetary system of a
people reflects everything that the nation wants, does, suffers, is.‖96
This quote is just as relevant to China now as it was when
91. Id.
92. Afraid of a Bump: China’s Economy is Set to Suffer Hardship But Not the Hard
Landing that Many Fear, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 2011, at 49 (arguing that despite the
existence of bad debts, the central government can afford to bail out the lower tiers of
government and the banks they borrowed from, or banks could underpay their depositors).
93. See SUSAN KRAUSE BELL & HOWARD CHAO, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN CHINA: RISKS
AND OPPORTUNITIES FOLLOWING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 3, 27 (2010). See also
Nathaniel Flannery, The Great Wall: How Transparency Problems and Governance Risk Are
Shaking Investor Confidence in China Companies, FORBES, June 17, 2011,
http;//www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2011/06/17/the-great-wall-howtransparency-problems-and-governance-risks-are-shaking-investor-confidence-in-Chinesecompanies/.
94. See generally Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935
(2011).
95. Id. See also Peter Lorentzen et al., Transparent Authoritarianism? An Analysis of
Political and Economic Barriers to Greater Government Transparency in China 1–2 (APSA
2010 Annual Meeting Paper, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1643986 (―China‘s government has taken significant steps to increase the access
of ordinary people to government-collected information . . . toward increasing openness and
facilitating more-responsive government at many levels.‖); Liang Ma & Jiannan Wu, What
Drives Fiscal Transparency? Evidence from Provincial Governments in China 2–3 (1st
Global Conference on Transparency Research, Rutgers Univ.–Newark, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1807767 (recognizing some transparency reforms).
96. Edward Carr, Europe and Its Currency: Staring into the Abyss, ECONOMIST, Nov. 12,
2011, at 61.
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Schumpeter first stated it in the context of other developing countries.
While outwardly China appears to be a largely inflexible
authoritarian regime, from the inside the Chinese people appear to be
seeking economic progress, power, and a meaningful place on the
world stage—efforts which again seem to be tied to resurgence in
Chinese national pride.97 Currently, it looks as though the global
financial crisis has provided China with an unprecedented
opportunity to muster its strengths—high levels of reserves, high
savings rates, and an increasingly educated populace—and parlay
them into global strength while the fortunes of the United States and
Europe wane.98
For instance, while on the surface China appears to be simply
satisfying its global commitments and modernizing its banking
system to spur growth, a deeper analysis suggests that China is
capitalizing on the relative strength of its economy and banking
system to further strengthen its global position. Indeed, it is perhaps
not entirely coincidental that China is on now track to surpass Japan
as the world‘s second largest economy, and is rapidly closing in on
the United States.99
As the Schumpeter quote above highlights, monetary systems
and banking reforms can be highly intertwined with a nation‘s
political and social goals. China currently provides a paradigmatic
example of such a situation. For instance, as China attempts to step in
to assist other countries suffering financial crises, many have argued
that China is actually ―increasingly trying to diversify its foreign
policy relationships‖ and ―trying to find the right ways to use [and
gain from] its new-found influence.‖100 In fact, commentators argue
that China‘s ―strategy‖ is increasingly becoming clear: ―[i]t wants to
use its economic leverage to make friends who may be more
forgiving in disputes over trade and human rights, and ensure doors
are open for its goods and corporate investments‖ in its main export
markets.101
97. See generally Sheng Ding, Branding a Rising China: An Analysis of Beijing’s
National Image Management in the Age of China’s Rise, 46 J. ASIAN & AFRICAN STUD. 293
(2011).
98. See Michael Pettis, Unimpressed with China’s High Reserve and GDP Growth
Numbers, SEEKING ALPHA (July 16, 2009), http://seekingalpha.com?article/149243unimpressed-with-China-hish-reserve-and-gdp-growth.
99. Brendon, supra note 81.
100. Hatton, supra note 1 (quoting Nicholas Consonery, an Asia analyst at Eurasia Group in
Washington, D.C.).
101. Id.

Rana new macro

232

5/22/2012 10:15 AM

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 27:215

As China steps up its role in the global financial arena, China is
gaining not only political and financial power, but an important sense
of pride and international confidence. This confidence, in fact,
appears to rise in almost direct proportion to the missteps of the
United States and other major financial powers. As one commentator
put it, ―[t]he narrative that China has been financing the United States
has taken hold in China . . . . If the U.S. is seen as irresponsibly using
that money, that won‘t go down well in China.‖102 Furthermore, as
debates over the most prudent or potentially successful banking and
monetary policies intensify in the global arena, ―[t]he highly
publicized and contentious nature of this debate is an additional nail
in the coffin of Chinese perception of the United States as a
stabilizing force and responsible actor in global economic affairs.‖103
In this light, another fascinating issue to consider is how China will
seek to use this moral as well as financial power. Recently, China has
begun to use this power to publicly scold the United States for its
perceived excesses and profligate spending.104
New examples of China‘s rising economic and political
influence emerge on nearly a daily basis.105 Again, unraveling the
complexities of China‘s current policies and actions is vital to
understanding both the true nature of the banking reforms currently
occurring in China and whether China‘s economic power will
continue to grow. In particular, understanding the transformations in
China‘s banking system is imperative for any detailed assessment of
their implications both for the global banking system and for China‘s
prospects for enhancing its financial and political power on the world
stage. As many have noted, China is asserting greater political and
economic influence in Africa and Latin America106 and has at least
the potential to surpass the United States as the world‘s largest
economy. As the United States increasingly assumes the mantle of
the world‘s debtor, and China emerges as the world‘s creditor, it

102. Davis & Back, supra note 10 (quoting Brookings Institution China scholar Eswar
Prasad).
103. Id.
104. E.g., Nina Mandell, China Scolds US Government: Learn to Live Within Your
Means, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 6, 2011, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-0806/news/29878509_1_credit-downgrade-debt-ceiling-structural-debt-problems.
105. See Vardi, supra note 90 (―In February [2012] China‘s central bank issued a threestep plan that would tear down the barriers surrounding China‘s big banks. Hopes quickly
emerged that China‘s banks could become international players much like China‘s industrial
companies, providing capital to a global economy that needs it.‖)
106. See Whipp & Anderlini, supra note 84.
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appears that the relative futures of U.S. and Chinese dominance,
though intertwined, are highly uncertain and unpredictable.
These remarks are intended to set the stage for greater dialogue
over China‘s recent rise to global political and financial prominence.
These remarks intentionally pose provocative questions about the
implications of China‘s banking transformation for China‘s and the
world‘s geopolitical and financial future. While an in-depth analysis
of these issues is beyond the scope of these remarks, I hope that these
remarks will provide fodder for future debates, and offer some
critical information and background for future research on the
implications of China‘s rise to power. I plan to address these
questions more fully in my future work, and I invite other scholars
and commentators to join me in this endeavor. Hopefully, these
remarks have identified some of the major questions that are worthy
of further study through academic and diplomatic dialogue.
CONCLUSION
Today, many countries, scholars, and key financial and political
players are proposing a myriad of ―solutions‖ to the financial
problems and crises spreading around the world. These remarks argue
for broadening the dialogue over the range of potential solutions to
include attention to systems such as China‘s, where innovative or
unprecedented solutions may ultimately emerge. In addition, these
remarks have sought to demonstrate that China is not merely
modernizing its banking systems for its own sake or to maximize
profits but also is seeking leverage through banking reform to
increase its might on the world stage. In essence, what started out as a
domestic modernization effort has rapidly become a tool in China‘s
arsenal as it seeks greater, if not dominant, global financial and
political power, with significant implications for the rest of the world.
These remarks have suggested that this happened both because
of China‘s recent economic successes as it has accelerated its banking
reforms, and because these reforms have coincided with the distress
of other major financial regimes. In this light, learning as much as
possible from China‘s successes in moving from a more public, statecontrolled system to a more liberalized free market system is vital to
understanding the future of global financial reform as well as aiding
the task of identifying best practices. The task of unraveling the
causalities between China‘s reforms, its growing political clout, and
the global financial crisis is highly complex, absolutely necessary,
and worth a great deal of future study.
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In addition, China‘s moves towards a ―New State Capitalism‖
could herald the emergence of a new global market system, or they
could simply fizzle into simply another historically contingent and
brief financial or societal movement. Since China too may soon face
some sort of financial crisis, whether China successfully develops a
new and vibrant form of state capitalism will be a critical question
over the next few years. We must study such developments closely
for insights as to how likely China is to weather coming financial
storms, and whether it may develop new and innovative solutions to
current financial malaises. We also should watch closely to see
whether China heeds the recent lessons from other countries currently
facing financial crisis and seeks to offer lessons of its own. In this
light, observing China‘s next steps will be both fascinating and
highly instructive as other countries struggle to recover from recent
financial crisis. Ultimately, I hope these remarks have set forth
interesting and potentially fruitful avenues for further research, as
well as provided a taste of the massive changes China is currently
pursuing at local, national, and global levels.

